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Introduction 
Rapid development in Asia has increasingly attracted worldwide 
attention, and has been especially impressive because it occurred 
under a variety of political regimes, was accompanied by modest 
inflation, and its fruits have been relatively equitably spread. 
Asia's growth stands in marked contrast to economic stagnation or 
decline in many African countries, the turmoil that dominates Middle-
Eastern countries, and the uneven economic performance in Latin 
American. Creativity, organizational ability, and hard work explain 
part of Asia's growth, but in addition, a significant part of this 
exceptional performance has been due to policies that are growth-
promoting. Policies that strangle agriculture--food price controls, 
overvalued exchange rates, and lack of investment in agricultural 
technology and infrastructure--have been less common in Asia than in 
other regions. Many policies have benefited agriculture directly or 
indirectly, and, as a result, rural development also has been 
impressive in the region. Asian cases can be cited to support the 
view that most countries must have a healthy agriculture before other 
parts of the economy grow rapidly. 
Because of the impressive overall economic growth, and the 
differences in the performance of financial markets within the region, 
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important lessons can be learned by studying Asia's rural financial 
markets <RFMs). Five distinctive features of RFMs in Asia will be 
highlighted in the following discussion: (1) the substantial amount of 
research that has been done on problems of RFMs in Asia compared to 
other regions; (2) the tremendous diversity that is found in Asian 
RFMs; C3) the large amount of innovation and change that is occurring 
in these markets; (4) the emphasis placed on rural savings 
mobilization in some of the most successful RFMs; and (5) the ability 
of RFMs in Asia to serve large numbers of borrowers and savers of 
small amounts. After discussing these distinctive features, I draw 
conclusions about what can be learned from RFMs in Asia. I open with 
a brief overview of the contributions of financial intermediation to 
development as a backdrop for my presentation. 
Functions q:L.financial l'iar-1-=:~.:ts 
While poorly understood, the normal functions of unmolested 
financial markets are simple. Their primary contribution is to 
intermediate among surplus and ~eficit firms or households <units>. A 
unit may have resources that exceed its attractive intra-firm 
investment or consumption opportunities. <In economic jargon, the 
unit faces low marginal returns on investments or low marginal utility 
from additional current consumption). Financial intermediation allows 
the surplus firm or household to earn a higher rate of return on its 
excesses or to postpone consumption until additional goods would yield 
more satisfaction. As Gonzalez-Vega has pointed out, when surplus 
units voluntarily deposit money with a financial intermediary, they 
are avoiding lower return investment and consumption alternatives 
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within their own unit. They would be forced to use these low-return 
alternatives if financial intermediation was not available. It is 
often overlooked that most firms and households are surplus units for 
at least short periods of time, while other units, even in the poorest 
society, have surpluses for longer periods <Von Pischke, 1978). This 
means that a properly functioning financial market can serve a large 
number of inhabitants by providing extensive and attractive deposit 
services. 
At the same time, financial intermediaries can use the claims-
on-resources mobilized from surplus units to issue loans to a smaller 
number of creditworthy deficit households or firms. Especially in 
dynamic economies, and even in those that are relatively static, there 
are large numbers of units that are unable to capitalize on high 
return investment options or attractive consumption alternatives. <In 
economic jargon, these units are facing a binding liqUidity constraint 
in their consumption or investment activities). Loans allow deficit 
units to increase production or consumption and to boost income or 
current satisfaction. Financial intermediation transfers claims-on-
resources from surplus to deficit units, and the spending of these 
claims, in turn, transfers resources from surplus to deficit units. 
Both savers and borrowers gain from the process, even after 
intermediaries withhold a small percentage of the transactions for 
their service. Compared to barter, or where financial markets are 
fragmented, society also realizes more efficient resource use and 
increased output when financial system are well integrated. 
A secondary contribution of financial intermediation is allowing 
units to more efficiently manage uncertainty. This is particularly 
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important for farmers. Because of vagaries of the weather, pests, and 
governments farmers commonly experience wide swings in prices 
received, crop yields, and incomes. To survive, they must adjust to 
these risks by holding surplus crops, livestock, gold, money, or other 
forms of savings--including deposits--that can be eas1ly liquidated. 
Unutilized credit reserves with family, friends, and intermediaries 
are also important ways to manage uncertainty. To be useful in risk 
management a financial system must offer a large number of people 
convenient deposit services and also be flexil;;>le enough to provide a 
large number of creditworthy people access to loans. 
In addition to the resource allocation and risk management roles 
that financial intermediaries normally play, governments and donors 
regularly distort financial markets through loan targeting: to speed 
development in a given area, to help a certain group of people, or to 
boost a particular activity (Sacay and others, Fry). F'ol i cymakers 
also manipulate credit programs to compensate individuals for the 
effects of natural disasters or for other government policies that 
adversely affect a target group's income. 
Numerous governments also attempt to reallocate income and assets 
to target groups through credit programs and use cheap credit and 
timid loan recovery to allocate political patronage. Some financial 
markets are mauled near-to-death by amorous policymakers, politicians, 
and donors. These actions fragment financial markets and seriously 
undermine their normal functions. These intrusions also cause savings 
mobilization to atrophy and overload financial markets with data about 
targeted loans that crowds out useful information <Adams and others>. 
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Literature on RFMs in Asia 
Many publications are available on rural financial markets in 
Asia (see References) and the volume and quality of this literature is 
quite distinctive compared to what is found in other Third World 
regions. For several decades the RFMs in Taiwan, Japan, and South 
Korea have been extensively described and diagnosed, although 
relatively few of the resulting publications are in English. Numerous 
recent publications on RFMs have resulted from efforts by the Asian 
Productivity Organization <APO), FAD and the Asian and Pacific 
Regional Agricultural Credit Association <APRACA), several government 
and donor agencies, and researchers. There are in excess of 1,500 
publications that treat RFMs in India alone <Grewal). Even relatively 
poor countries such as Bangladesh have a rapidly increasing list of 
publications on rural finance <Esguerra, Bangladesh Bank). The 
Technical Board on Agricultural Credit <TBAC> has also produced a 
large number of excellent publications that detail RFM problems and 
progress in the Philippines. Recent publications by APRACA and the 
World Bank provide additional fascinating insights into rural credit-
savings operations in the Peoples' Republic of China CPRC>. The 
amount of literature on RFMs in Indonesia, Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 
and Pakistan is also extensive <ADB>. 
Most of this literature is descriptive and provides information on 
numbers and amounts of agricultural loans made by specific lenders or 
by entire formal RFMs <AID, APO, APRACA>. The past several years 
increasing numbers of publications describing savings deposit 
activities have also appeared. Overall, this growing literature shows 
that a number of countries in Asia have recently rapidly expanded both 
-6-
the nominal and real amounts of formal agricultural credit. Rural 
savings mobilization in Taiwan, the PRC, South Korea, and Japan has 
also been reported to be impressive. During the 1970s Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Pakistan were among the leaders in terms of percentage 
increases in volume of formal agricultural loans. Despite overall 
rapid increases in the volume of these loans in most Asian, there has 
likely been a decrease in the real value of formal agricultural loans 
during the last few years in at least three countries: the 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Publications on India show that, 
in addition to a substantial increase in the volume of formal 
agricultural loans, there has been an even more dramatic increase in 
the number of rural bank branches since the early 1970s. Less 
dramatic, but important, increases in the numbers of formal financial 
outlets have recently occurred in the Philippines and Bangladesh 
<Meyer and Esguerra>. 
Another sizable part of this literature focuses on the uses made 
of loans and the demand for credit: measuring the impact of loans at 
the borrower level, evaluating the overall results of a credit program 
or policy, or estimating loan demand. Credit impact studies have been 
particularly prominent in India. Some attent1on has also been given 
to these issues in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Bangladesh. Much less attention has been given to evaluating the 
sources of financial services and describing and explaining lender 
behavior. There has also been little research done on how government 
financial market policies, overall economic policies, and donor 
agencies affect RFMs. 
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A small, but interesting, body of literature has emerged on 
informal rural finance in Asia. This includes pieces on rotating 
savings and credit associat1ons in Vietnam, Sri Lanka, South Korea, 
Indonesia, and India. Additional papers on informal lenders in 
Malaysia, India, and the Philippines describe the operations of a 
variety of informal rural lenders. It is interesting to note that 
informal lenders are given a more positive interpretation in the 
literature than is heard in lay discussions in the region, especially 
in Southern Asia. 
As an aside, I am impressed by the differences in views nbout the 
informal lenders that one finds in Asia. In most of East Asia very 
little is said about informal lenders and usury. In the Philippines 
and in West and South Asia policymakers are preoccupied with replacing 
informal lenders. Because of the lack of careful research on the 
economics of informal lending and on the transactions cost of 
borrowing from formal and informal sources, it is impossible to sort 
myth from reality in emotion-charged discussions about informal 
lenders. I am uncomfortable with arguments--like those about 
moneylenders--that stereotype groups of people and present a few 
horror stories to make a general point. Discussions of informal 
lenders are laced with anecdotes about interest rates that go as high 
as 400 percent per year, and evil moneylenders who take away the land 
of the borrower. There is very little information available that 
shows the average borrowing cost on informal loans, documents the 
average opportunity costs of funds handled by informal lenders, and 
details valuable services that informal lenders provide <exceptions 
are Singh, Harriss, Bouman, and Barton). Most discussions of informal 
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lenders have ethnical and racial undertones that I find distasteful. 
Clearly, more objective research is badly needed in Asia on the 
economics, rather than the ethics, of informal lending. 
Several other topics have received recent attention in the 
literature: loan recovery problems, and deposit mobilization. Some 
studies show that several Asian countries have chronic loan recovery 
problems, while lenders in other countries regularly recover a very 
high proportion of their farm loans. There is no accord on the 
primary causes of loan default. Some argue that the problems lie 
mainly with borrowers who are too poor to repay--or that defaulters 
have had bad luck and are unable to repay. At the same time, others 
argue that lender shortcomings reduce loan recovery. Still others 
argue that loans are part of a grants system in which neither 
borrower, lender, or the government is serious about loan repayment. 
Research on deposit mobilization provides equally ambivalent results. 
Some of the literature stresses the paucity of deposit mobilization 
due to the poverty of rural people, while other studies report large 
amounts of savings mobilized and emphasize the importance of the 
incentives and opportunities to save as determinants of savings 
behavior <Ong and others, Lee and others). 
I am encouraged that a large amount of useful research and 
writing is being done on RFMs in Asia. It reflects the rapidly 
increasing capacity of Asians to ask and answer important questions 
about rural finance. It may also result from the presence of a 
relatively high proportion of successful RFMs that can politically 
withstand analysis and reporting. In some countries agricultural 
credit programs perform so poorly that researchers are afraid to 
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report that, "the king is wearing no clothes.'' The volume of 
literdture on RFMs in Asia is increasing to the point where 
consideration might be given to additional synthesis publications, 
multi-country analysis, and some discussion of overall research design 
to make research results more useful to policymakers. 
Diversit~ 
The literature also shows a greater diversity in rural financial 
markets among countries around the arc from Japan to Pakistan than is 
found in other regions of the world. Three types of diversity stand 
out: major differences in the sources of rural financial services, 
diversity in performance of rural financial markets, and diversity in 
the policy instruments used in RFMs. 
Institutional Sources 
A large variety of formal and informal sources of financial 
services can be found in Asia. In some countries <Indonesia, Bhutan, 
Burma, Bangladesh, and Nepal) informal loans bulk large in rural 
areas. In other countries the rapid growth in supply of formal loans 
has been accompanied by growth in informal financial services in rural 
areas <Taiwan>. In other countries, rapid expansions in formal loans 
have probably caused a reduction in the volume of informal loans, at 
least for a while <Philippines and Sri Lanka>. My guess is that every 
possible form of informal finance is found in some part of Asia. The 
diversity in informal finance reflect the creativity of Asians, the 
heterogeneity in financial needs that exist, and a reluctance by 
farmers to use formal loans. 
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The institutional make up of formal sources of rural finance is 
also diverse across Asia. Farmers' associations or cooperatives 
dominate formal rural financial activities in South Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, and The PRC. Various types of cooperatives also provide 
lesser proportions of financial services to rLtral people in many other 
countries in the region. My impression, however, is that cooperatives 
have declined in their importance as sources of financial services in 
many Asian countries during the past 20 years. Pakistan, India, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh, for example, have recently stressed 
agricultural lending through banks. Much of the cooperative credit 
system in the Philippines has largely disappeared and been replaced by 
loans from rural private banks and government owned banks. In at 
least India and Indonesia there are also a large number of semi-formal 
financial institutions that provide important and extensive financial 
services in rural areas <Gonzalez-Vega, Nayar). In several countries 
the private sector plays a large role in providing formal financial 
services in rural areas <The Philippines and Malaysia), while in other 
countries most formal credit comes from government owned 
intermediaries <Vietnam, Burma and Thailand). 
Performance 
There is a broad range in the performance of RFMs in Asia. Some 
of the world's strongest rural financial markets are there along with 
several of the weakest. Also, some of the most sophisticated and 
comprehensive rural financial systems are located there <Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea) along with the most rudimentary <Burma, 
Bhutan, and Nepal>. It is useful to use five criteria when measuring 
the overall performance of RFMs: (1) the number and proportion of 
rural people who have regular access to formal loan and deposit 
services. (2) The amount and distribution of transactions costs 
involved in financial intermediation. <3> The extent to which 
financial intermediaries are self sustaining and generate enough 
revenues to cover their operating costs, losses due to defaults, and 
capital erosion due to inflation. (4) Loan recovery performance. 
And, (5) the extent to which RFMs are able to mobilize funds in rural 
areas. 
Because most research in Asia has measured credit impact or has 
concentrated on credit projects, only fragmentary information on these 
five overall criteria is available. It appears, however, that formal 
RFMs in Taiwan, South Korea, and the PRC provide lending and deposit 
services to a larger proportion of the rural inhabitants than do 
formal RFMs in Nepal, Burma, Indonesia, and Pakistan. 
Aside from India, Bangladesh, and the Philippines, there has been 
very little research done on transactions costs in RFMs in Asia. The 
Indian research, along with more extensive research done elsewhere on 
this topic, show that lender loan transactions costs often exceed 
interest charges, especially when small and new borrowers are 
involved. This research also shows that some lenders ration loans by 
shifting part of their normal loan transactions costs to non-preferred 
borrowers. Additional information on transactions costs and their 
distribution among the participants in financial intermediation would 
clarify the extent to which financial intermediaries cover their costs 
and maintain the purchasing power of their loan portfolios. Clearly, 
more research is needed on transactions costs in Asia. 
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There is more information available on loan recovery performance 
than on any of the other criteria. While the usefulness of some of 
this information is diminished by weak measures of loan recovery or by 
problems of unreported loan refinancing, clear patterns do emerge from 
this information. Several countries have chronic loan recovery 
problems, while other countries have few problems. Those countries 
that have low crop prices and yields in agriculture tend to have more 
loan recovery problems than do those countries that have high 
agricultural yields and attractive crop prices. Also, those countries 
that distort financial markets in attempts to target loans, to 
transfer income to certain groups, or who use these markets to 
allocate political patronage also tend to have serious loan recovery 
problems. 
As will be discussed more in detail later, there is a great deal 
of difference among countries in the emphasis placed on mobilizing 
voluntary savings in RFMs. In several countries <Taiwan and Japan) 
rural savings deposits exceed the volume of formal agricultural loans 
made in the country. As Kato has pointed out, voluntary rural savings 
made a sizable contribution to the early financing of the non-
agricultural sector in Japan. In other countries relatively few 
voluntary savings are mobilized in rural areas and most of the funds 
for agricultural lending come from governments or donors. 
Policies 
A wide range of government decisions affect RFMs. The diversity 
and number of these policies are too great to capture here. I'll 
only comment briefly on two types of policies: those that affect the 
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yields and prices in agriculture, and those aimed at altering lender 
behavior. 
It is clear that RFMs work better when farmers get relatively 
high yields and prices. It is easier for intermediaries to mobilize 
savings and find creditworthy borrowers when agriculture is growing 
vigorously. The strongest RFMs in Asia are in those countries with 
relatively high agricultural prices, relatively large government 
investments in rural infrastructure, and with high agricultural 
yields. Excellent natural endowments of soil, climate, and water 
reinforce positive government policies. Correct policies, however, 
appear to be more important than natural endowment: witness the 
prosperous farmers in South Korea with modest natural resources 
compared to the low productivity of farmers with far superior 
resources in the Mekong Delta. The recent dramatic increases in 
agricultural output in the PRC also demonstrate how sensitive 
agricultural prosperity is to government policies. It is typical for 
governments that abuse or ignore agriculture to also distort RFMs in 
attempts to right other wrongs. These distortions in RFMs are largely 
ineffective in offsetting the low prices and yields that farmers 
receive, and the losses from the damage done to the ability of the 
RFMs to carry out their normal functions are substantial <David>. 
A variety of policies are used by governments and donors in 
attempts to alter behavior of financial intermediaries. Policies in 
India and Bangladesh, for example, are aimed at forcing banks to open 
more rural branches. A number of countries in the region, including 
Thailand and the Philippines, require banks to lend a certain 
percentage of their loans to agriculture or to rural target groups. A 
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number of countries in the region also use preferential rediscount 
lines in central banks to stimulate targeted lending. Most countries 
impose some limits on the interest rates that can be charged on formal 
loans and paid on financial deposits. These range from attempts to 
charge zero interest rates on loans in Pakistan to very few interest 
rate restrictions on regular credit lines in the Philipp1nes. Some 
countries have had relatively inflexible nominal interest rates <India 
and the PRC), while other countries have been quick to change these 
nominal rates <Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan). Some governments 
also reward or penalize intermediary behavior through reserve 
requirement adjustments. In addition, governments and donors channel 
targeted funds into RFMs as a way of altering lender behavior. 
Why this tremendous diversity in the structure, performance, and 
policies in Asia, and what can be learned from it? In large part the 
structures of RFMs are diverse in Asia because the cultures and 
sqcieties are diverse. This does not mean that little can be learned 
from looking across countries for common patterns. Many people become 
confused by stressing the differences in the institutions that provide 
financial services to rural people and searching for some unique 
institution. Instead, I feel primary emphasis should be placed on the 
performance of the financial intermediaries, and on how various types 
of policies affect this performance. This may lead to generalizations 
that are applicable across a large number of countries. 
Ionovation and Change 
There is more innovation and change going on in RFMs in Asia than 
can be found in other parts of the Third World. This includes major 
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adjustments such as the deregulation of interest rates in the 
Philippines, the reorientation of the PRC's RFMs from serving large 
production units to catering to small units, and the reverse in 
Vietnam. While these major changes make the headlines, I am even more 
impressed with the large number of small, often isolated, financial 
innovations in Asia. It is a veritable bubbling caldron of new ideas 
whose diversity and complexity can only be touched upon here. 
Financial intermediaries create two types of innovations: those 
that dilute the effect of, or evade the intent of, some regulation or 
policy that adversely affects the intermediary; and inventions that 
reduce the costs of existing services or allow the intermediary to 
provide new services. The first class of innovations contribute 
little to the well-being of a country, while the cost-reducing 
innovations are vital for any modern economy. I see far more of the 
latter type of innovations in Asia. Many credit programs in Asia, for 
example, have experimented with various forms of group loans in 
attempts to lower transactions costs and improve loan collection <e.g. 
Thailand, Nepal and the Philippines). Numerous projects have also 
used mobile banks as a methods of extending financial services into 
remote areas <Bangladesh and Pakistan). Banks in several countries 
have opened pawnshops or issued passbooks with pictures and borrowing 
records as ways to speed securing small loans <Indonesia, Sri Lanka, 
and Pakistan). 
A number of countries have experimented with loan, crop, and 
deposit insurance as ways of improving the quality and quantity of 
rural financial services <India, Japan, and the Philippines) •• 
Several banks have also experimented with use of low-cost rural 
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branches--barefoot bankers--as ways of bringing formal financial 
services to the poor <Sri Lanka and Pakistan). Other banks have set 
up small branches in urban central markets to serve the financial 
needs of agricultural merchants <The Philippines>~ or extended 
agricultural loans through informal lenders <Malaysia). I am also 
impressed with innovations in Bangladesh that have allowed a quasi-
bank <Grameen Bank> to extend a large number of loans to low-income 
women, and with a number of projects in the region that are 
experimenting with savings mobilization schemes. 
APO and FAO/APRACA have done a commendable job of assembling and 
reporting information on some of these innovations and changes. It 
would be useful if these efforts were continued and expanded. 
Carefully-done case studies of some of the most prominent types of RFM 
innovations could be very useful to those who are searching for ways 
to extend and improve RFMs. Those of us who work in the social 
sciences might emulate the experience of physical scientists who build 
seed-banks in international research centers. The ~seeds'' of the 
social science are ideas and innovations. 
Savings Mobilization 
Most of the formal RFMs in low income countries outside Asia rely 
on governments or donors to supply the majority o~ the funds lent in 
rural areas. The main exceptions being the involuntary savings 
mobilized by cooperatives through share purchases required to receive 
loans, and several rural banks in Latin America that have recently 
experimented with savings mobilization <Peru and the Dominican 
Republic). In contrast, RFMs in several Asian countries mobilize 
rural voluntary deposits in excess of agricultural lending needs 
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<Taiwan and South Korea), while RFMs in several other countries 
mobilize a substantial part of the money lent to agriculture <PRC, 
Bangladesh and India). Overall, the attitude toward mobilizing 
voluntary savings in Asia is much more positive than elsewhere in the 
world. 
In part, the superior savings mobilization performance of RFMs in 
Asia has been due to the previously mentioned growth in rural incomes 
in many of these countries <Ong and others, and Lee and others). The 
widespread use of attractive incentives and opportunities to save in 
financial form, however, have also been important elements in this 
success story. The fact that inflation has been less severe in most 
Asian counties than elsewhere in the Third World has allowed many 
savers to realize positive real rates of interest on t~1eir deposits in 
Asia. Many rural depositors in Latin Amer1ca, Africa and in the 
Middle East, in contrast, have rec~lved negative real rates of 
interest. Where inflation :1as been a problem in Asia <Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Intiones1a, and South Korea), governments have allowed 
higher nominal rates of interest on deposits. Formal financial 
intermediaries in Asia also offer their depositors a broader range of 
savings instruments than is found elsewhere. 
My guess is that savings mobilization has also been more 
prominent in Asia than elsewhere because less emphasis has been placed 
there on trying to lead various development efforts with massive 
amounts of cheap credit. Targeted government or donor money is 
usually fed into RFMs through concessionary rediscount windows in 
central banks. These facilities provide ultimate lenders with large 
amounts of loanable funds at interest rates that are lower than 
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intermediaries must pay to mobilize voluntary savings deposits. 
Concessionary rediscount facilities provide intermediaries powerful 
1ncentives to ignore savings mobilization. Policymakers often 
overlook the fact that a normally functioning RFM will provide 
services to a much large number of savers than borrowers. When RFMs 
are drawn into patronal relationships with central banks and 
governments or donors, through extensive use of rediscount facilities, 
they are also encouraged to ignore the needs of surplus units in rural 
areas. This is particularly damaging to low income firms and 
households, since they often have few alternatives to hold small 
amounts of surplus, other than in accounts with financial 
intermediaries. 
Using the performance criteria mentioned earlier, my impression 
is that those RFMs in Asia that perform well are those that also 
emphasize savings mobilization <Meyer>. Not only do RFMs that 
mobilize large amounts of deposits provide a valuable service to a 
much larger number of rural people than those RFMs that do not, but 
they also appear to have a much larger measure of independence from 
corrosive political pressures. It is much more difficult for politics 
to intrude into the lending process if few of the funds lent are 
provided by the government. This, in turn, usually results in fewer 
loan recovery problems. 
Small Borrowers aod Sav~~ 
The most distinctive feature of RFMs in Asia has been their 
ability to serve a fairly large numbers of borrowers and savers of 
small amounts, and to often make a profit doing so. Formal 
intermediaries in most of the rest of the Third World shy from lending 
to borrowers of small amounts and seldom attempt to offer attractive 
deposit services to savers of small amounts. In many cases 
intermediaries may actively discourage new borrowers and borrowers of 
small amounts by imposing relatively large loan transactions costs on 
nonpreferred borrowers. At the same time the intermediary may also 
discourage depositors of small amounts by setting large minimum-
balance requirements, sharply limiting the hours when funds can be 
withdrawn, and paying low--even negative--real rates of interest on 
small accounts. Understanding why many RFMs in Asia have succeeded in 
helping the rural poor, while RFMs in other countries have largely 
failed in this task, provides a deeper understanding of the workings 
of financial markets. 
In part, RFMs better serve the rural poor in Asia because 
borrowers and depositors of small amounts make up a large part of the 
rural population; poor people are the only-game-in-town in many areas! 
At the same time, there are a number of countries or regions outside 
Asia where the rural poor are a large part of the population, yet they 
have limited access to formal financial services (e.g. Bolivia, Haiti, 
and Northeast Brazil). Some have argued that these regional 
differences are largely due to cultural factors: e.g. that Asians will 
save while others won't, that Asians repay loans while others don't, 
and that Asians know how to use loans more wisely. While cultural 
factors affect all behavior, the ability of RFMs in Asia to serve the 
poor is largely due to the application of proagricultural policies. As 
mentioned earlier, governments in Asia have gen~rally adopted policies 
that resulted in relatively high yields, prices, and incomes in 
-20-
agr-icultur-e. This, in tur-n, has cr-eated a br-oadly based demand for 
financial services in rural ar-eas, and allowed many financial 
inter-mediaries to realize economies of scale and scope. 
Policies directly aimed at rural financial intermediar-ies in some 
Asian countries have also been conducive to the development of 
dependable flows of credit and deposit ser-vices for- low income people. 
Those gover-nments that have str-essed balanced development of RFMs, 
given little emphasis to tar-geting loans, avoided using RFMs as income 
transfer mechanisms, limited their use of concessionar-y rediscount 
facilities out of centr-al banks, and allowed intermediar-ies to pay and 
char-ge positive real rates of interest gener-ally have RFMs that do the 
best job of serving the rur-al poor-. 
One must be car-eful here to note the difference between policies 
that l'"esLtl t in tr-ansi t..!?..r.-:L.cr-edi t pr-ogr-ams for the rur-al poor and 
policies that help develop RFMs that provide gustained finall£.ial 
~v~~ to this group. Few people gain much fr-om the opportunity to 
obtain one cheap loan or- to not repay a single loan. Likewise, it is 
of little benefit to a per-son to be able to make a single deposit or 
withdr-awal fr-om a savings account. On the other hand, it is of gr-eat 
value to an individual to have a dependable and sustained r-elationship 
with a financial intermediary that allows borr-owing and depositing, 
depending on the varying needs of the individual. Transitor-y credit 
pr-ojects for the rur-al poor, such as occurred in Sr-i Lanka in the late 
1970s, give politicians short run advantages and make the news 
headlines, but leave the financial system less able and willing to 
pr-ovide sustained services to this group. Paradoxically, the rural 
poor are harmed in the long run by cheap credit projects that are 
ostens1bly implemented for their benefit! They are harmed because 
cheap credit undermines the abil1ty of the financial intermed1ary to 
Sltstain qual1ty financial services, provides the financial 
intermediaries with the lowest returns on those very activities that 
are most expensive to carry out <new and small loans), and discourages 
intermediaries from offering attractive deposit services for the rural 
poor. 
Because RFMs in Asia are less fragmented by repressive policies 
than is true in most of the rest of the third world, they do a more 
efficient job of intermediating between surplus and deficit units. 
This, in turn, results in additional output and income in rural areas 
over what would occur if financial markets were more repressed. Much 
of this additional output occurs in small farms and small non-farm 
rural enterprises, and enhances the additional output and income 
stimulated by other general economic policies in Asia favorable to 
agriculture. Thus, integrated financial markets lead to still further 
strengthening of the process of financial intermediation. 
~onclusions and Implications 
I come away from a review of the literature on RFMs in Asia with 
four strong impressions. First, financial markets are vital in 
supportinH development, but are largely ineffective when used to lead 
development efforts. Product prices and yields are far more important 
in determining producer behavior than are interest rates and the 
availability of formal loans; at the same time interest rate 
regulations and other government regulations strongly and adversely 
influencing intermediary behavior. I am also convinced that 
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concessionary credit programs, under any political regime, will always 
inflict more harm than good on the rural poor. Benefits from 
financial intermediation are always proportional to access to the 
services they provide. Access, in turn, is highly correlated with 
political power, income, and assets owned. Thus, income transfers 
through financial markets always have a regressive effect on income 
distributions and asset ownership. In addition, income transfer 
programs usually leave financial intermediaries weaker and less able 
to carry out their normal and important functions. 
Second, I am persuaded that government policies and donor 
activities are important in explaining success or failure in RFMs. 
RFMs do not work well if governments abuse agriculture through low 
farm prices and lack of investments in rural infrastructure. RFMs 
work even more poorly if governments and donors abuse financial 
intermediation through concessionary rediscount lines, cheap credit 
policies, heavy use of loan targeting, and political meddling in the 
determination of who should receive loans. 
Third, I am convinced that RFMs work more efficiently, and 
certainly more equitably, when both lending and savings mobilization 
are emphasized. Attractive and readily available savings deposit 
services will benefit far more of the rural poor than will transitory 
cheap-credit programs. 
Fourth, I am also impressed by the excellent work that APO and 
FAO/APRACA are doing in improving communication among countries in 
Asia on issues of rural finance. Because of the diversity and changes 
that are occurring, international agencies have an excellent 
opportunity to continue to facilitate and coordinate communications, 
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training, and evaluation in the area of RFMs. Fortunately, these 
activities need not involve large amounts of money. I suggest that 
international agenc1es focus on making contributions in three areas: 
(1) encourage the collection of literature on RFMs in Asia in at least 
one central library. This might include periodic issuing of 
associated bibliographies, and a Newsletter that briefly reports on 
some of the most interesting literature. APRACA is already doing some 
of this. (2) Encourage additional case studies on RFM policies and 
projects that succeeded or failed. Again, APRACA has done some 
excellent work in this area on loan recovery and savings mobilization. 
<3> Encourage more communication and coordination on issues of 
research and evaluation in the area of rural finance. While extensive 
research is being done in the region on this topic, some of it would 
be more useful to policymakers if it were diagnostic and less 
descriptive. A few regional workshops for researchers to share their 
results and learn about new techniques might also yield substantial 
benefits. 
Asia is a unique laboratory for those of us interested in 
explaining the performance of rural financial markets. While failures 
in RFMs are abundant around the world, success stories are scarce and 
are largely found in Asia. Because the process of financial 
intermediation is simple and essentially the same, regardless of the 
culture where conducted, much can be learned from the Asian success 
stories that is useful for policymakers in other regions who want 
their RFMs to perform well. 
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